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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Johann N. Neem

Taking Modernity’s Wager: Tocqueville, Social
Capital, and the American Civil War
Alexis de Tocqueville (ed. Aurelian Craiutu and Jeremy Jennings),
Tocqueville on America after 1840: Letters and Other Writings (New
York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 576 pp. $99.99 cloth
$32.99 paper
Although Alexis de Tocqueville did not live to witness the American Civil War, it would not have surprised him. A close student of
democracy, Tocqueville believed that America’s fate lay in its ability to maintain social order through voluntary association. This recent translation into English of selections of Tocqueville’s writings
about the United States during the two decades after publication
of his Democracy in America offers historians an opportunity to witness Tocqueville’s growing concern about America’s fate.1 Taking
advantage of this new collection, this essay interprets why and
how Tocqueville lost faith in American democracy’s ability to
avoid France’s fate—civil war, anarchy, and, possibly, despotism.
Building on Tocqueville’s writings as well as recent historical
work on civil society, the public sphere, and social capital, it then
presents a new perspective on the crisis that led Northerners and
Southerners to take up arms in 1861.
The American and French revolutions ushered in modernity
and with it what Seligman called “modernity’s wager.” By giving
up on the idea of a natural, external authority—the kind that religion provided in traditional society—modernity unleashed individuals to see themselves as sacred (transcendental) and to view all
Johann N. Neem is Associate Professor of History at Western Washington University. He is
author of Creating a Nation of Joiners: Democracy and Civil Society in Early National Massachusetts
(Cambridge, Mass., 2008); “Creating Social Capital in the Early American Republic: The
View from Connecticut,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXXIX (2009), 471–496; “Squaring the Circle: The Multiple Purposes of Civil Society in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America,”
Tocqueville Review, XXVII (2006), 99–121.
The author thanks Aaron Sheehan-Dean for providing an insightful reading of an earlier
draft of this essay.
© 2011 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, Inc.
1

Hereinafter, toa.
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impositions on their freedom as coercion and power rather than
legitimate authority. In such a world of radical individualism,
however, Seligman wondered what holds “seemingly autonomous selves together at all”?2 Taylor and Habermas stress the
wager’s relation to society as a whole. Taylor reminds us of the
novelty of constructing a social order absent transcendent principles; Habermas concludes that modern social orders in a “postmetaphysical” age can be constructed only by the constant deliberation of individuals.3 Seligman, Taylor, and Habermas confront
the same issue—whether modern democratic society can sustain
itself over time. Such is the wager that the United States made in
1776, and France in 1789.
Since Tocqueville’s time, many scholars have argued that the
key to sustaining modern social order is to develop mediating institutions that connect individuals together into a larger social
whole. Mediating institutions, especially voluntary associations,
are vital to modern democratic social orders because they encourage the production of social capital which, in turn, produces social
trust. Social trust can be deªned as the level of conªdence that citizens have in each other and in their social and political institutions. Without the authoritative structures of the old order, modern democratic societies rely on social trust to prevent violence
and/or excessively self-interested behavior.4 Social capital gener2 Adam B. Seligman, Modernity’s Wager: Authority, the Self, and Transcendence (Princeton,
2000), 12, xi.
3 Jürgen Habermas (trans. William Rehg), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); Charles Taylor, Modern Social
Imaginaries (Durham, 2004).
4 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New
York, 2000); Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, 1997), esp. 75–100; Eric M. Uslaner,
“Democracy and Social Capital,” in Mark E. Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust (New York,
1999), 121–150; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New
York, 1995), esp. 3–12. For discussions about the deªnition(s) of social capital, see John Farr,
“Social Capital: A Conceptual History,” Political Theory, XXXII (2004), 6–33; John Field, Social Capital (London, 2003); Robert I. Rotberg, “Social Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America, Australasia, and Europe,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXIX ( 1999), 339–
356; Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating
Structures in Public Policy (Washington, D.C., 1977). For a discussion that distinguishes clearly
between networks, norms, and trust, see Karen Schweers Cook, “Networks, Norms, and
Trust: The Social Psychology of Social Capital (2004 Cooley Mead Award Address),” Social
Psychology Quarterly, LXVIII (2005), 4–14; for a more critical perspective, Theda Skocpol and
Morris P. Fiorina, “Making Sense of the Civic Engagement Debate,” in idem (eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C., 1999), 1–23; Michael W. Foley and Bob
Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, VII (1996), 38–52. For an in-
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ates social trust by creating the networks that link people together,
making possible the feelings of mutual affection and obligation
that form the basis for common life. In Putnam’s words, social
capital comprises “connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them.”5 The more extensive these networks are, the more
likely they are to promote “generalized reciprocity,” trust, cooperation, and conªdence in government: “Frequent interaction
among a diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized reciprocity. Civic engagement and social capital entail mutual
obligation and responsibility for action.”6 Without social capital,
produced through the mediating networks of civil society, individuals would not connect their private lives to their public ones.
Lacking a sense of generalized reciprocity, citizens would then be
unwilling to make sacriªces for each other.
Social capital, however, is double-edged. In Putnam’s terms,
it has both a “bridging” effect that unites individuals and society
and a “bonding” effect that creates outsiders. At the national level,
networks bridge citizens to the extent that they overcome ethnic,
regional, and/or class divisions, but they also bond citizens by dividing them from other peoples. A similar dynamic takes place at
the local level. Small, cohesive, closed networks reduce social capital’s integrative function even as they link people who might otherwise be isolated.7 Such was the case during the sectional crisis.
Networks that had once functioned as bridging social capital fractured under the stress of slavery and became sources of regional,
bonding social capital. By Abraham Lincoln’s election, Northern
and Southern Americans no longer trusted each other, the result
being exactly what Tocqueville and other critics of modernity
most feared.
mediating associations To Tocqueville, under France’s hierarchical ancien régime, nobles mediated between the people and the
king, helping to secure social integration. But these old relations
triguing historical analysis that correlates personal violence to levels of social trust, see
Randolph Roth, American Homicide (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).
5 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 19.
6 Ibid., 20–21. On government, see Marc J. Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton, 2005).
7 In addition to Putnam, Bowling Alone, see Uslaner, “Democracy and Social Capital.”
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were undermined by the idea of equality. The potential for anarchy increased with the demise of the aristocracy and the divine
right of kings.8 Yet, Tocqueville concluded, equality—and thus
democracy—was the future for Europe as well as the United
States: “Everywhere a diversity of historical incident has redounded to democracy’s beneªt. . . . The gradual development of
the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact.”9 Associations could forge new connections between people to replace
those destroyed by revolution. Only “citizens joined together in
free association might then replace the individual power of nobles,
and the state would be protected against tyranny and license.” No
wonder Tocqueville believed that “in democratic countries, the
science of association is the fundamental science.”10
8 For Tocqueville’s fears of modernity, see Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and
Political Thought of Jacob Burkhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville (New York, 1992);
Jon Elster, “Tocqueville on 1789: Preconditions, Precipitants, and Triggers,” in Cheryl B.
Welch (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville ( New York, 2006), 49–80; Craiutu,
“Tocqueville’s Paradoxical Moderation,” Review of Politics, LXVII (2005), 599–629; Sheldon
S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton, 2001), which should be read along with Olivier Zunz’s review, “Holy Theory,” Reviews
in American History, XXX (2002), 564–570; Joshua Mitchell, The Fragility of Freedom:
Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future (Chicago, 1995). According to Matthew Mancini, Alexis de Tocqueville and American Intellectuals: From His Times to Ours (Lanham,
Md., 2006), Tocqueville “knew that the most arresting feature of the whole American democratic enterprise was its sheer endurance” (76). For a critical examination of how
Tocqueville’s concern with modernity (the relationship between equality and liberty) prevented him from fully appreciating how modernity bred new inequalities through large organizations, see Seymour Drescher, Dilemmas of Democracy: Tocqueville and Modernization
(Pittsburgh, 1968).
9 Tocqueville (trans. Arthur Goldhammer), Democracy in America (New York, 2004), 6. See
also toa: Tocqueville to Edward Everett, Feb. 15, 1850, 115–116; “Report on Democracy in
Switzerland, Jan. 15, 1848, 354; “Preface to the Twelfth edition of Democracy in America”
(1848), 374–376. According to Françoise Mélonio and François Furet, “Introduction”
in Tocqueville (trans. Alan S. Kahan), The Old Regime and the Revolution (Chicago, 1998), I, to
Tocqueville the French Revolution “was nothing more than the sudden acceleration of a
movement towards equality that was at work in the whole western world” (4). Francis
Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy, XI (2000), gives Tocqueville’s reasons for believing in the ultimate victory of equality (11–17). Tocqueville did not imply that
democratic societies were absolutely egalitarian. He recognized, and criticized, the growing
inequalities spurred by industrial capitalism. For him, equality intimated, ªrst, democratic
societies in which no permanent classes existed, and second, societies in which citizens did not
view their fundamental stations and relationships as hierarchical.
10 Tocqueville, Democracy, 7–10, 599. For a discussion of Tocqueville’s ideas about mediating institutions, see Annelien de Dijn, French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville:
Liberty in a Leveled Society? (New York, 2008), 146–151; Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics
after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, 2008), 294–308. Dijn emphasizes the royalist and aristocratic roots of Tocqueville’s fears of democracy, whereas Jainchill
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In a democracy, tyranny could emerge from equality itself, as
the majority pursued its goals without concern for the rights and
interests of minorities.11 Yet, although in theory “no durable obstacle” existed to check the people’s will, in practice political associations, especially political parties, served as barriers to limit what
popular majorities could do. Political associations encouraged
democratic deliberation by enabling minorities “to ascertain their
numerical strength” in order to “weaken the moral ascendancy of
the majority.” In addition, partisan “competition among ideas”
might make enough of “an impression on the majority” to bring a
minority party to dominance. Finally, thanks to “universal suffrage,” Americans’ political associations could never claim to speak
for a majority; majorities were determined during elections. If a
party lost, it must accept its minority status and try to persuade citizens to vote for it.12
But, importantly, Americans did not associate solely for political reasons; they also carried out a broad range of activities
through what Tocqueville labeled “civil associations.” Political asemphasizes the role republican ideas played in shaping Tocqueville’s hope that American citizens’ engagement in politics would help mitigate the dangerous effects of modern individualism. See also Harvey Mansªeld and Delba Winthrop, “Editors’ Introduction” to Tocqueville
(trans. idem), Democracy in America (Chicago, 2000), xxiii–xxxix; for Tocqueville’s ideas about
voluntary associations, John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New
York, 1999), 160–169; Pierre Manent (trans. John Waggoner), Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy (Lanham, Md., 1996), 23–26; Jack Lively, The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de
Tocqueville (New York, 1965), 127–143. Furet, Welch, and Larry Siedentop argue that understanding the social and political context in which Tocqueville wrote is as important as
understanding his speciªc intellectual inºuences. See Furet, “The Intellectual Origins of
Tocqueville’s Thought,” Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville, VII (1985–1986), 117–129;
Welch, De Tocqueville (New York, 2001), 7–48, 88–95 (on associations); Siedentop, Tocqueville
(New York, 1994), 20–40.
11 Tocqueville, Democracy, 197, 218. Tyranny was not just a political problem. Although
Tocqueville was committed to checking political tyranny, his deeper concern was that the
idea of majoritarianism, if elevated too high, would prevent freedom of thought as all people
sought to conform to the mean. See Paul Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift: Montesquieu,
Rousseau, Tocqueville & the Modern Prospect (New Haven, 2009), 154–189; Donald J. Maletz,
“Tocqueville’s Tyranny of the Majority Reconsidered,” Journal of Politics, LXIV (2002), 741–
763; Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 202–228, 241–259, 304–373; Mansªeld and Winthrop, “Editors’ Introduction”; Manent, Tocqueville; Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism, esp. 34–80;
James T. Schleifer, The Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Chapel Hill, 1980), 191–
211; Lively, Social and Political Thought, 71–103.
12 Tocqueville, Democracy, 221–222. Even in the United States, suffrage was limited by race
and gender. See Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple
Traditions in America,” American Political Science Review, LXXXVII (1993), 549–566; idem,
Civic Ideals: Conºicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997).
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sociations were vital to political deliberation, whereas civil associations provided the underlying bond that held society together.13
Thus, Tocqueville’s discussion of civil associations falls within his
exploration of the “inºuence of democracy on the sentiments of
Americans.”14 Tocqueville’s basic assumption was that individualism “disposes each citizen to cut himself off from the mass of his
fellow men and withdraw into the circle of family and friends.”
“Having created a little society for his own use,” the individual
“gladly leaves the larger society to take care of itself.” Aristocracy
connects all of society “in a long chain from peasant to king,” but
democracy “breaks the chain and severs the link.” People turn inward and no longer concern themselves with the common good.
Instead, Tocqueville concluded, each man is left “in the loneliness
of his own heart.”15
Individualism had two major, related risks, Tocqueville
argued—anarchy and despotism. Anarchy was intolerable because
it bred insecurity and inequality, leading citizens to embrace despotism for the sake of security and equality, but at the expense of
liberty. Only mediating institutions, through which democrats
could collectively generate their own social order, could check
these dangerous tendencies.16 Tocqueville believed that Americans
had two effective types of mediating institutions to protect their
equality without resorting to despotism—local government,
through which ordinary citizens came “to value the affection of
their neighbors and relatives,” and voluntary associations.17 By fostering “the reciprocal action of human beings on one another,” associations ensured that Americans would forge social order, address social concerns through cooperation, and learn to care for
each other. In association, Tocqueville wrote, citizens’ “feelings
and ideas are renewed, the heart expands, and the human spirit develops only through the reciprocal action of human beings on one
13 For interesting discussions of the relations between different kinds of associations, see
Dana Villa, “Tocqueville and Civil Society,” in Welch (ed.), Cambridge Companion to
Tocqueville, 216–244; William A. Galston, “Civil Society and the ‘Art of Association,’” Journal
of Democracy, XI (2000), 64–70.
14 Tocqueville, Democracy, 579.
15 Ibid., 585–587. A good discussion of Tocqueville’s evolving understanding of individualism can be found in Jean-Claude Lamberti (trans. Goldhammer), Tocqueville and the Two Democracies (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 168–190.
16 See Mitchell, Fragility of Freedom; Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies.
17 Tocqueville, Democracy, 590, 592.
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another.”18 Like other Americans and Europeans of his era,
Tocqueville hoped that the emotional bonds of sympathy would
create new links between people to replace the hierarchical ones
of the old order.19 The result would be the generation of social
capital which, in turn, would produce social trust.
In the published ªrst volume of The Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville made clear that centralization, anarchy, and
despotism were likely wherever mediating institutions were weak.
The long-term narrative of The Old Regime is continuity between
the pre- and postrevolutionary eras. Centralization of state power
began under the French monarchy and culminated in Jacobin tyranny and Napoleonic despotism. As the monarchy centralized, it
stripped away the aristocracy’s mediating function. The French
people, unaccustomed to liberty, engaged in an orgy of equality
that overturned old institutions but produced no new forms of social capital. Instability ensued until Napoleon imposed social order
from above, protecting French equality but destroying French liberty. As Tocqueville wrote, “when a people has destroyed its aristocracy, it runs toward centralization as if self-impelled.”20
the antebellum sectional crisis in america The question
facing Tocqueville following the publication of Democracy in America was whether American debates about slavery risked destroying
the fragile social order that democracy had constructed. In the
18 Ibid., 596–599. The result of associating was to transform individualism into “the doctrine of self-interest rightly understood.” Volume II, pt. 2, of Democracy begins with the dangers of equality and individualism (581–589) and proceeds to discuss civil associations (590–
609) and how they mitigate individual interest. Associations taught Americans that their
private lives depended on their public cooperation (610–613).
19 James T. Kloppenberg, “Life Everlasting: Tocqueville in America,” in idem, The Virtues
of Liberalism (New York, 1998), 71–81; Andrew Burstein, “The Political Character of Sympathy,” Journal of the Early Republic, XXI (2001), 601–632; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Democracy and Associations in the Long Nineteenth Century: Toward a Transnational Perspective,”
Journal of Modern History, LXXV (2003), 269–299; Nicole Eustace, Passion Is the Gale: Emotion,
Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 2008); Neem, Creating a Nation
of Joiners: Democracy and Civil Society in Early National Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass., 2008),
23–32; Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 2009); Jason Frank,
Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham, 2010), 101–127.
20 Tocqueville (eds. Furet and Mélonio; trans. Kahan), The Old Regime and the Revolution,
the Complete Text (Chicago, 1998), I, 137. See also Furet and Mélonio, “Introduction,” in
Ibid.; Dijn, “The Intellectual Origins of Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the Revolution,”
Modern Intellectual History, V (2008), 1–25; Welch, Tocqueville, 121–164; Furet, “De Tocqueville and the Problem of the French Revolution,” in idem (trans. Elborg Forster), Interpreting
the French Revolution ( New York, 1981), 132–163.
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decades after 1840, Tocqueville continued to extol American
government—its bicameralism, its executive power, and its independent judiciary—for its ability “to combat the natural defects of
democracy.”21 Americans balanced freedom and order to protect
liberty.22 During debates about the appropriate constitution for the
Second Republic, Tocqueville consistently advocated learning
from Americans the lesson that democracy and liberty are distinct,
equally important goods. Democracy on its own tended toward
anarchy or tyranny, but the co-existence of a bicameral legislature
and an independent judiciary ensured that impassioned majorities
would never be able to impose their will on minorities, thus protecting liberty within a democratic context.23
In private, however, Tocqueville worried that the United
States would lose modernity’s wager. In their ªne introduction to
the volume under review, the editors argue that as Tocqueville
observed the United States, he began to “question some of the
most signiªcant claims of his widely acclaimed book.” They
rightly note that Tocqueville was frightened by the transformation
of American mores as a result of westward expansion, immigration, and slavery. But his correspondence in the two decades following Democracy in America also suggests that he never questioned
his core theoretical belief, expressed in the penultimate chapter of
volume I, in America’s accidental situation (its land and isolation),
its laws, and its “habits and mores” as the “causes that tend to
maintain the democratic republic in the United States.”24 He now
concluded, however, that these same factors might be its undoing.
Tocqueville’s ªrst cause for concern was westward expansion.
In Democracy in America, he had identiªed the expanse of the
American continent and its separation from Europe as opportunities; the American landscape enabled political decentralization, local democracy, freedom from foreign intervention, and the wide
21 Tocqueville, “Report on Democracy in Switzerland,” January 15, 1848, toa, 363.
22 Tocqueville, “Popular Banquet at Cherbourg,” March 19, 1848, toa, 373
23 Tocqueville, “Contributions to the Debate on the Constitution of the Second Republic” (1848–1851), toa, 377–408.
24 Craiutu & Jennings, “The Third Democracy: Tocqueville’s Views on America after
1840,” toa, 36; Tocqueville, Democracy, 319. My argument also challenges Hugh Brogan’s
conclusion that Tocqueville, despite having access to thoughtful American correspondents,
offered no theory for the sectional crisis. See Brogan, “Alexis de Tocqueville and the Coming
of the American Civil War,” in Brian Holden Reid and John White (eds.), American Studies:
Essays in Honor of Marcus Cunliffe (New York, 1991), 83–104.
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distribution of wealth and prosperity.25 The native advantages that
had once allowed Americans “to commit great errors with impunity” now threatened the social order by unleashing selªsh, aggressive, antisocial passions.26 Tocqueville felt “apprehension” that
Americans’ “spirit of conquest and even plunder” would undermine the moderate mores that democracies require to maintain
social order and liberty.27 Moreover, his letters reveal his concern
that America’s wars for expansion risked greater European intervention in North American affairs.
Law was the second major contributor to American stability.28
Along with federalism and local institutions, an independent judiciary was instrumental in tempering majoritarian tyranny and engendering democratic habits. Judges appointed for life could check
overzealous majorities, but antebellum judges were becoming
“dependent on the multitude or the parties (because of the election of judges by universal suffrage and due to the short duration
of their mandate).” Elected judges no longer could “offer a
sufªcient guarantee to the individual as to encourage him not to
take up the task of defending himself.”29
Nothing mattered more to the stability of democratic republics, however, than the “inºuence of mores.”30 Democratic liberty
was fragile because modern social orders were fragile. Democracy
was not simply a system of government; it was a cultural system.
Thanks to Americans’ “habits of the heart,” or “mores,” the dan25 Tocqueville, Democracy, 319–330.
26 Tocqueville to Theodore Sedgwick, August 29, 1856, toa, 181–183.
27 Tocqueville to Sedgwick, December 5, 1852, toa, 136–137. See also Tocqueville’s reference to Americans’ “spirit of adventure” in Tocqueville to Jared Sparks, December 11,
1852, toa, 139–140.
28 Tocqueville, Democracy, 330–331.
29 Tocqueville to Francis Lieber, October 9, 1857, toa, 261. See also Tocqueville, “Report
on a Work by Mr. Th. Sedwick. Entitled: A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation
and the Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law” ( July 1858), toa, 456–460; Tocqueville,
“Report on Switzerland.” By the onset of the Civil War, twenty-one of thirty states had
adopted judicial election. See Kermit L. Hall, “The Courts, 1790–1920,” in Michael
Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (eds.), The Cambridge History of Law in America. II. The
Long Nineteenth Century (New York, 2008), 115. For a good discussion of debates about the
judiciary, see Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early American Republic,
1789–1815 (New York, 2009), 400–468.
30 Tocqueville, Democracy, 331–356: “Laws do more to maintain a democratic republic in
the United States than physical causes do, and mores do more than laws” (352). Good discussions of the role of mores in Democracy in America can be found in Donald J. Maletz,
“Tocqueville on Mores and the Preservation of Republics,” American Journal of Political Science,
XLIX (2005), 1–15; Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies, 13–39.
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gers of democratic anarchy and tyranny were held at bay. But
Tocqueville worried that the combination of new immigrants
coming to the United States and slavery’s expansion meant that
America’s mores would change, endangering the delicate balance
that Americans had achieved in their effort to win modernity’s
wager.
In a letter of 1854, Tocqueville wrote that he was “astounded” to learn the extent of German emigration to America.
He worried that “Germans [would] take their ideas with them to
the United States and, to a certain extent, preserve them there,”
because Germans, according to Tocqueville, had been acculturated under “the long practice of absolute power.” Unlike Americans who might be expected to defend their freedoms, Germans,
already victims of “centralization,” exhibited a “widespread passion for positions and dependency.” Since the emergence of despotism was one of Tocqueville’s worst fears, “the rapid introduction of foreigners into the United States and thus into the English
race [was for him] the greatest danger faced by America.”31
Notwithstanding Tocqueville’s worries about immigration,
he was adamantly antiracist. To Tocqueville, all human beings, although not all cultures, were equal.32 Hence, upon receiving Arthur de Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inegalité des races humaines (1853),
which posited a scientiªc basis for racial inequality, Tocqueville
31 Tocqueville to Gustave de Beaumont, August 6, 1854, toa, 330–331; to Sedwick, August 29, 1856, toa, 181–183; to Sedgwick, October 14, 1856, toa, 188–189.
32 The argument herein takes issue with the conclusion of Curtis Stokes in “Tocqueville
and the Problem of Racial Inequality,” Journal of Negro History, LXXV (1990), that
Tocqueville’s distinction between cultural and racial/biological inferiority is practically unimportant (1–15). As Schleifer, Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, makes clear,
Tocqueville early in his travels to the United States discarded the idea that race as biology
could explain differences between societies and peoples (62–72). As Stokes correctly points
out, the cultural argument enabled Tocqueville to legitimate British and French imperialism
and to claim that enslaved people in French colonies required a period of “apprenticeship”
before being capable of sustaining a free society (Tocqueville, “Report on Abolition,” in Seymour Drescher [ed.], Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Reform [New York, 1968], 130–133).
However, Tocqueville was equally critical of elite, white aristocratic mores—those of both
the old regime French nobility and the Southern plantation aristocracy. In short, Tocqueville
looked beyond the lens of race to the larger issue of the relationship between democracy and
culture, well aware that not only did democracies require certain cultures but also, as he wrote
in Democracy in America, that different cultures would create different kinds of democratic
societies and institutions. As a case in point, he did not recommend that the French “follow
the example set by American democracy or imitate the means it has used to achieve its goal,”
concluding that it would be “a great misfortune for the human race if liberty were obliged to
exhibit identical features wherever it manifests itself ” (Tocqueville, Democracy, 364).
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wrote, “I do not believe anything of it at all.” Instead, Tocqueville
attributed differences to culture: “I think that there is in each nation, whether it comes from race or rather the education of the
centuries, something very tenacious, perhaps of a permanent character.”33 Gobineau’s characterization of different human beings as
“cousins at best,” justiªed the retrograde system “of masters and
slaves by birth or right” that Tocqueville associated with proslavery ministers in the American South.34
Tocqueville’s concern about immigration was really about
whether new immigrants would share, or come to share, the same
habits of the heart as native-born Americans. Democracy, as Stout
argued, is a form of praxis. It is a tradition that is often unarticulated, given expression through constant use among a people over
time.35 Tocqueville would have agreed. In various letters, he attributed to Americans a “common sense” and “practical wisdom”
that had emerged out of both their social conditions and history.36
In 1857, he wrote that although America’s elected leaders sought
to ºatter and deceive citizens, he was conªdent that Americans’
“practical sense,” a sense that emerged from practice rather than
reason, would protect self-government from corrupt leaders.37 If
American democracy was to survive, ordinary people’s habits of
the heart would have to be stronger than both immigrants’ European habits and political elites’ machinations.
Although westward expansion, judicial elections, and immigration endangered America, nothing worried Tocqueville more
than slavery’s effect on mores, and nothing concerned him more
33 Tocqueville to Gustave de Beaumont, November 3, 1853, toa, 328–329.
34 Tocqueville to Arthur de Gobineau, January 24, 1857, toa, 337.
35 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, 2004). For an insightful discussion of
the relationship between ideas and experience in this regard, see Susan Dunn, “Revolutionary
Men of Letters and the Pursuit of Radical Change: The Views of Burke, Tocqueville, Adams,
Madison, and Jefferson,” William and Mary Quarterly, LIII (1996), 729–754; Wolin, Tocqueville
Between Two Worlds, 222–228.
36 Tocqueville to Edward Everett, August 5, 1851, toa, 121–122. See Tocqueville, Democracy, 348–352: “The American learns about the law by participating in the making of it. He
teaches himself about the forms of government by governing. He watches the great work of
society being done every day before his eyes and, in a sense, by his hand.” See Robert T.
Gannett, Jr., “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township,” American Political Science Review,
XCVII (2003), 1–16; Rahe, Soft Despotism, 194–202; Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds;
Villa, “Tocqueville and Civil Society”; Schleifer, Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America,
121–141.
37 Tocqueville to Edward Vernon Childe, April 2, 1857, toa, 224; to Sedgwick, June 13,
1857, toa, 236.
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than the sectional political crisis.38 One of the longest sections in
the ªrst volume of Democracy in America concerned slavery. In it,
Tocqueville expressed his hatred for slavery, his commitment to
human equality, and his certainty that a race war in the South
would play out much like the internal conºict of the French Revolution. In fact, this section in Democracy might be read as a primer
for understanding Tocqueville’s conception of relations between
the state, the aristocracy, and the people in The Old Regime.
Tocqueville viewed slavery as a violation of both nature and
Christianity, depriving enslaved Americans of “all the privileges of
humanity.” Many commentators had argued that enslaved people
were naturally suited to their condition. Tocqueville, as he would
do again in The Old Regime in his discussion of French peasants,
argued that the causal chain worked the other way around. Africans, taken from their native society and thrown into slavery, became acculturated to slavery’s mores: “Violence made him a slave,
but habituation to servitude has given him the thoughts and ambitions of one.” Slavery taught African Americans that they were
other people’s property. As a result, although not inferior by nature, enslaved people had neither the opportunity nor reason to
develop their intellects.39
The development of slavery threatened democracy in the
United States because it created a situation similar to that in
prerevolutionary France—a master class habituated to the mores
of aristocracy, and an enslaved black majority habituated to the
mores of dependence. The Southern aristocracy was as useless in
Tocqueville’s portrayal as the French aristocracy would be in The
Old Regime. Tocqueville celebrated the virtues of the free-labor
system, but in the South, masters were “contemptuous not only of
38 For Tocqueville’s position on slavery, see Mitchell, Fragility of Freedom, 167–182; Joel
Lieske, “Race and Democracy,” Political Science and Politics, XXII (1999), 217–224; Peter Augustine Lawler, “Tocqueville on Slavery, Ancient and Modern,” South Atlantic Quarterly,
LXXX (1981), 466–477; Sally Gershman, “Alexis de Tocqueville and Slavery,” French Historical Studies, IX (1976), 467–483; Drescher, Dilemmas of Democracy, 151–195.
39 Tocqueville, Democracy, 366–367. Tocqueville asked his French readers to “reason by
analogy.” The French past manifested “great inequalities whose origins lay solely in legislation.” Despite the obvious truth that there could be nothing “more factitious than a purely legal inferiority,” Tocqueville reminded his readers that differences between the nobility and
the peasants had “persisted for centuries.” The “artiªcial barriers” that aristocrats had developed to distinguish themselves from “the mass of the people,” which the French had to struggle to tear down, were analogous to the intractable traditions of racial aristocracy within the
United States (Tocquevillle, Democracy, 393–400).
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labor but of all enterprises that succeed by virtue of labor.” “Living
in idle comfort, [they had] the tastes of idle men.” Slavery produced an anachronism—an aristocratic culture in the midst of the
most modern, democratic, egalitarian society in world history.40
To Tocqueville, the end of slavery depended on changing
“the law of inheritance.”41 Abolishing primogeniture was crucial
to the transformation of America’s social order because aristocracy
could not survive when every generation had to earn its wealth
and status anew.42 Southerners had long “resembled the noble
families of Europe,” but when primogeniture ended, free workers
emerged to challenge the old regime. Slavery might slowly disappear as the economic and social beneªts of free labor became apparent and as the structural foundation—inheritable land—of aristocracy was undermined.43 But the immediate abolition of slavery
would prove “the greatest source of danger for Whites.” As in
France, liberating millions of people acculturated to servitude and
giving them the ideas of equality prior to the habits and mores of
equality would produce a violent, disorderly revolution that
would undermine democratic social order and produce a “rebellion with a future leader”—perhaps a Napoleon, a Toussaint
L’Ouverture, or even a Nat Turner.44 Despite the gross generalizations in his portrayal, Tocqueville’s South looked to him too
much like prerevolutionary France, with an increasingly counterproductive aristocracy, an emerging free labor bourgeoisie (thanks
to the end of primogeniture), and a peasant class not yet capable of
embracing its rightful equality and liberty.
Tocqueville viewed slavery as “one of the greatest crimes that
human beings could commit against the general cause of human40 Tocqueville, Democracy, 400–401. For ideas about free labor and the dignity of work, see
Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), 271–286; Eric Foner, Free Soil,
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York, 1970).
Whatever Tocqueville and white Northerners might have thought, however, historians
should not draw too clear a line between a modern North and an aristocratic South. See Edward L. Ayers, What Caused the Civil War? Reºections on the South and Southern History (New
York, 2005), 131–144; Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American
South, 1810–1860 (Chapel Hill, 2004), 2 v.; William G. Thomas III and Ayers, “An Overview:
The Differences Slavery Made: A Close Analysis of Two American Communities,” American
Historical Review, CVIII (2003), available at www.vcdh.virginia.edu/AHR.
41 Tocqueville, Democracy, 402.
42 Ibid., 585–587.
43 Ibid., 402–404.
44 Ibid., 410, 417.
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ity.”45 But his concern was not just the morality of slavery but also
its effect on American democracy.46 Tocqueville had discovered in
American democracy a form of equality that produced neither of
his twin fears of disorder or tyranny. The combination of westward expansion, immigration in the North, and slavery in the
South, however, risked undermining the mores that sustained
America’s social order.
As early as 1844, Tocqueville had expressed his deep interest
in America’s domestic affairs and its foreign policy, especially toward Britain regarding its interest in Oregon.47 A decade later, he
observed that the exclusively northern anti-Catholic KnowNothing party was “dangerous to the internal peace of the Union”
and that western “popular disorder,” a reference to Bleeding Kansas, demonstrated the potential for disorder and anarchy.48 But because slavery created mores distinct from those in northern free
societies, Tocqueville worried that the passions unleashed by the
sectional crisis could not be molliªed. By August 1856, as Americans readied for a presidential election, Tocqueville wrote that Europeans “are beginning to believe that you are not far from the
time when you will separate yourselves from one another,”
though he continued to “hope that this moment is farther away
than people usually think.” Nonetheless, Tocqueville was concerned that increasing “foreign elements” had sullied Americans’
“practical sense” about democracy.49 In June 1857, after the vio45 Tocqueville to Sedgwick, January 10, 1857, toa, 195. Given his views about the sanctity
of property (see, for example, Tocqueville, “Popular Banquet at Cherbourg,” March 19,
1848, toa, 372–374; idem, “Preface,” toa: 375–376), Tocqueville might well have agreed
with Sen. John C. Calhoun that Northerners were erecting majoritarian tyranny by destroying the Southern (white) minority’s property rights. But becauseTocqueville believed that
slavery was a moral wrong, he concluded that its eradication did not involve the violation of
any rights. See Margaret Kohn, “The Other America: Tocqueville and Beaumont on Race
and Slavery,” Polity, XXXV (2002), 169–193.
46 Tocqueville to Edward Vernon Childe, April 2, 1857, toa, 222–225. See also
Tocqueville to Nassau Senior, September 4, 1856, toa: 336; Tocqueville to Jared Sparks, July
15, 1857, toa: 240; Tocqueville to Sedgwick, October 14, 1856, toa, 187–189.
47 Tocqueville to Lieber, December 14, 1844, toa, 77–78: “Write to us as soon as you can
after your arrival in America. . . . The beginning of a new administration [the Polk presidency], its domestic and foreign policy, the state of the country, its attitude toward England,
its likely decisions on the great issues of Texas, Oregon, and the Tariff . . . they all exercise
greatly our curiosity.” Tocqueville to Lieber, December 2, 1844, toa, 76–77.
48 Tocqueville to Sedgwick, September 19, 1855, toa, 164–165.
49 Tocqueville to Sedgwick, August, 29, 1856, toa, 181–183; October 14, 1856, toa, 187–
189.
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lence in Kansas and the brutal beating of Sen. Charles Sumner by
Rep. Preston Brooks on the Senate ºoor, Tocqueville wondered
whether President Buchanan would be “capable of calming the almost revolutionary agitation” that followed his election. Americans appeared to have reached “a high level of violence which
would be the infallible sign of civil war in Europe and which, even
in America, could end by leading to it in the near future.”
Tocqueville lamented the “evil passions” that could ultimately disrupt America’s delicate balance of equality, order, and liberty.50
By fall 1857, Tocqueville was interrogating his American correspondent about the country’s “present situation,” by which he
meant not just “the state of the [political] parties, but what is more
permanent than their squabbles, that is, the very foundation of
mores and political customs.” He noted that many Europeans returning from America remarked on the “violent mores and uncouth habits” that they had encountered in America. “People
[had to] carry arms with them in case they [had] to resort to legitimate self-defense.”51 The advantages that had once sustained the
republic—land, law, and, most of all, mores—no longer seemed
effective.
social capital and social solidarity Tocqueville’s understanding of the sectional crisis as expressed in his private correspondence was drawn almost directly from a speciªc chapter in
Democracy in America’s ªrst volume. Had he lived longer, he might
have returned to the discussion of mediating institutions in the
book’s second volume to locate the cause of the American Civil
War in the breakdown of the associations that had sustained the
social order. The ªght about slavery fragmented America’s civil
society; by 1860, social capital and generalized reciprocity between the two regions had all but vanished. Slavery may have
caused the crisis, but Americans went to war because they no
longer trusted each other.
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville had noted the danger of
individualism without mediating institutions. As society’s stock of
bridging social capital decreased, cooperation would also decline,
and violence might become more likely. As Roth recently argued
in American Homicide, personal violence and social trust are corre50
51

Tocqueville to Sedgwick, June 13, 1857, toa, 234–236.
Tocqueville to Lieber, October 9, 1857, toa, 260–262.
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lated. The more that individuals trust their governmental institutions and elected leaders, the less likely are they to view violence
as necessary or justiªed to achieve their ends.52
Tocqueville long recognized that slavery created a fracture
that challenged efforts to forge mediating institutions. He saw the
North and the South divided by “material interests” that “constitute[d] not so much parties as rival nations.” Northern manufacturers supported tariffs, whereas Southerners, dependent on Atlantic commerce, favored free trade. These economic divisions
“pose[d] a threat to the future of the Union.” By 1860, the North
and South had indeed come to regard each other as distinct nations. The issue, however, was not simply economics but the erosion of social trust caused by the breakdown of civil society’s mediating institutions.53
The American Revolutionary elite had been anxious to prevent their new republic—stripped, as it was, of the old mediating
institutions—from following a fate similar to Rome’s.54 They
placed their faith in classical republican ideals—education, religion, and the wide distribution of property—to ensure a virtuous,
engaged, and independent citizenry.55 After the French Revolution, the issue seemed even more pressing, as Americans watched
in horror the violence spawned in the name of republicanism. By
52 Read broadly, Roth’s argument in American Homicide suggests that the loss of social trust
enabled leaders in both sections to channel Americans’ fears and anger into organized political
violence.
53 Tocqueville, Democracy, 201. The following discussion develops themes explored in John
L. Brooke, “Cultures of Nationalism, Movements of Reform, and the Composite-Federal
Polity,” Journal of the Early Republic, XXIX (2009), 1–33; Neem, “Civil Society and American
Nationalism, 1776–1865,” in Elisabeth S. Clemens and Doug Guthrie (eds.), Politics and Partnerships: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2011).
David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861 (New York, 1976), identiªed nationalism as
one of the causes of the sectional divide that produced the Civil War. Nicholas Onuf and
Peter S. Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War (Charlottesville, 2006), make a strong case that the modern idea of liberal nationhood deªned both
Northerners’ and Southerners’ responses to the sectional crisis and, ultimately, their decision
to go to war. See also Don H. Doyle, Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question
(Athens, 2002).
54 John Greville Agard Pocock, “Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American
Thought,” in idem, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (New
York, 1971), 80–103.
55 Idem, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill,
1969); Richard D. Brown, Knowledge Is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America,
1700–1865 (New York, 1989).
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the nineteenth century, new class and social divisions had led to riots in America’s expanding urban centers, reminding many observers of how fragile civil peace was.56
Federalists endorsed a strong central government to keep factional squabbles within and between the states from delivering the
young republic to anarchic civil war and, ultimately, the hands of
eager European empires.57 The Constitution, however, created a
“roof without walls,” a new political structure without the emotional glue that might encourage Americans’ loyalty to the new
government.58 Under George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist party envisioned a nationalism constructed from
the top down through policies that appealed to Americans’ economic interests, through symbolic invocations of national unity in
the press, and through what Waldstreicher calls “sentimental acts
of celebration” involving ordinary citizens. Instead of national
unity, however, the result was the mobilization of the Jeffersonian
Republican party in opposition to this centralization of power. Although Federalists helped to lay the groundwork for a national
identity, their efforts to impose social solidarity faltered.59
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, political and
religious associations, not individual virtue nor the state alone, sustained America’s democracy by developing social trust and joining
56 Rachel Hope Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Antislavery (New York, 2009); Paul A. Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in
New York City, 1763–1834 (Chapel Hill, 1987); idem, Rioting in America (Bloomington, 1996).
Both Cleves and Gilje express a Tocquevillian sensibility that social division and violence are
constantly present in society. Cleves urges historians to stop thinking of violence as the exception and instead recognize in human nature and society “the continuing ever-present potential for violence” (xiv). See also Roth, American Homicide.
57 David C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence,
2003); Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776–1814 (Madison, 1993).
58 John M. Murrin, “A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,” in Richard R. Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter (eds.), Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity (Chapel Hill, 1987), 333–348.
59 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism,
1776–1820 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 108–173, 111. For Federalists’ nation-building strategies, see
Stephen Minicucci, “The ‘Cement of Interest’: Interest-Based Models of Nation-Building in
the Early Republic,” Social Science History, XXV (2001), 247–274; Smith, “Constructing National Identity: Strategies of the Federalists,” in Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara B. Oberg (eds.),
Federalists Reconsidered (Charlottesville, 1999), 19–40; Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of
Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York,
2003); Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought
in Revolutionary America (Lawrence, 1990).
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people across America’s vast territory into an imagined community.60 These associational ties relied on a system of publicly encouraged and often publicly ªnanced internal improvements—
roads, rivers, canals, and later railroads—that uniªed America geographically, as well as on the federal postal service’s cheap rates for
newspapers that allowed civic organizers to reach readers across
the continent.61 Although the state encouraged new links across
space, ordinary Americans could choose whether to participate in
the vast network of political and religious groups that came to span
the continent—North, South, and the expanding West.62
With the creation of the federal state came federal politics
and, in turn, national political coalitions.63 Although the ªrst parties were largely elite efforts, expanding suffrage resulted in the
mass mobilization of voters. By the 1820s, party builders had created tools to bring people to the polls. Parties hosted banquets and
dinners and provided election-day entertainment. For many
Americans, party afªliation comprised an important part of their
60 The idea of the nation as an imagined community comes from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reºections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983). On the
role of associations in generating communal ties across space, see Amanda Bowie Moniz,
“Saving the Lives of Strangers: Humane Societies and the Cosmopolitan Provision of Charitable Aid,” Journal of the Early Republic, XXIX (2009), 607–640.
61 Richard R. John, “Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835,” Studies in American Political Development, XI (1997), 347–380; John L. Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and
the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill, 2001); Naomi Wulf,
“‘The Greatest General Good’: Road Construction, National Interest, and Federal Funding
in Jacksonian America,” in Cornelis A. van Minnen and Sylvia L. Hilton (eds.), Federalism,
Citizenship, and Collective Identities in U.S. History (Amsterdam, 2000), 53–72; John, Spreading
the News: The American Postal Service from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, Mass., 1995). The state
was also involved in shaping the legal rights and privileges that associations could exercise, a
function that Tocqueville generally overlooked. See Kevin Butterªeld, “A Common Law of
Membership: Expulsion, Regulation, and Civil Society in the Early Republic,” Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, 133 ( July 2009), 255–276; William J. Novak, “The American Law of Association: The Legal-Political Construction of Civil Society,” Studies in American Political Development, XV (2001), 163–188.
62 Although political parties were at times inclusive of the poor and other minorities, many
other associations had largely middle-class or elite members. Early-nineteenth-century violence stemmed in part from the failure of mediating institutions to be sufªciently inclusive, or,
in Putnam’s phrasing, bridging. See Mary P. Ryan, “Civil Society as Democratic Practice:
North American Cities during the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
XXIX (1999), 559–584; Gilje, Rioting in America, 63–64; Roth, American Homicide, 186–189.
For a more optimistic evaluation of the bridging inºuence of associations, see Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Norman, 2003), 108–
131; Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution, 328–329.
63 Skocpol, Diminished Democracy, 36–37.
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identity. Partisans eagerly joined party-sponsored militias, debated
their neighbors, and enjoyed patronage from political elites. In the
streets of America’s expanding cities, partisans marched proudly
and, at times, engaged in mock and real violence against their rivals.64 The proliferation of newspapers and the wide circulation of
stories enabled American readers to imagine themselves as a national political public. In Brooke’s words, party organizations and
public partisan activities served to “mediate between the lawmaking powers of the state and the essentially private pursuits of
happiness by ordinary people,” constructing bridges linking individuals to the national community.65
Religious leaders were even more important to the formation
of a national public in civil society. As states abandoned their tax
support for churches and as Americans moved west, ministers embarked on a vast organizational effort to attract new congregants
and to sustain and expand their churches.66 One result was the formation of national denominations.67 But ministers also taught their
64 Andrew W. Robertson, “‘Look on this Picture . . . And on This!’ Nationalism, Localism, and Partisan Images of Otherness in the United States, 1780–1820,” American Historical
Review, CVI (2001), 1263–1280; Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic:
Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 2000); Michael Schudson, The
Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life (New York, 1998); Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy
and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, 1997), 94–131; idem,
Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880 (Baltimore, 1990); Simon P. Newman,
Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic (Philadelphia,
1997); Joel H. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838–1893 (Stanford, 1991). On partisan
militias, see Albrecht Koschnik, “Let a Common Interest Bind Us Together”: Associations, Partisanship, and Culture in Philadelphia, 1775–1840 (Charlottesville, 2007), 90–152.
65 Brooke, “Reason and Passion in the Public Sphere: Habermas and the Cultural Historians,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXIX (1998), 45. For partisanship and identity, see
Koschnik, “Let a Common Interest Bind Us Together”; Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual
Fetes, 201–235; Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the
Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, 1983). For the importance of print in creating a national identity, see Anderson, Imagined Communities; Carolyn Eastman, A Nation of Speechifers: Making an
American Public after the Revolution (Chicago, 2009); David Paul Nord, “Newspapers and
American Nationhood,” in idem, Communities of Journalism: A History of American Newspapers
and Their Readers (Urbana, 2001), 80–91. On the emergence and spread of newspapers, see
Jeffrey L. Pasley, “Tyranny of Printers”: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville, 2001); Thomas C. Leonard, News for All: America’s Coming-of-Age with the Press
(New York, 1995), 28–32; Sandra Gustafson, “The Emerging Media of Early America,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, CXV (2005), 205–250.
66 Nathan O. Hatch, “The Second Great Awakening and the Market Revolution,” in David Konig (ed.), Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic
(Stanford, 1995), 243–264.
67 Sidney Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New York,
1963); Donald G. Mathews, “The Second Great Awakening as an Organizing Process, 1780–
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congregants to form voluntary reform associations to spread the
religious values that they believed to be necessary in a republic devoid of the transcendent supports of the old order. Beginning in
the 1810s and 1820s, American men and women joined massmembership associations for such diverse purposes as distributing
Bibles and tracts, supporting missionaries to the West and abroad,
and encouraging temperance. These associations often had a central ofªce, but much of their work was done by local auxiliaries
that depended on middle-class women and men volunteers. Even
more than parties, religious leaders circulated newspapers, magazines, tracts, and their associations’ annual reports around the
country, linking citizens together into shared reading communities.68
1830: An Hypothesis,” American Quarterly, XXI (1969), 23–43; Kathleen D. McCarthy, American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society, 1700–1865 (Chicago, 2003), 49–77.
68 Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners, 81–113; Skocpol, Diminished Democracy, 85–98; Nord,
Faith in Reading: Religious Publishing and the Birth of the Mass Media in America (New York,
2004); Anne M. Boylan, The Origins of Women’s Activism: New York and Boston, 1797–1840
(Chapel Hill, 2002); Peter J. Wosh, Spreading the Word: The Bible Business in Nineteenth-Century America (Ithaca, 1994); Lori Ginzberg, Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics,
and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States (New Haven, 1990); Blumin, The Emergence of
the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City, 1760–1900 (New York, 1989), 192–229;
Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978);
Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers 1815–1860 (New York, 1978); Lois W. Banner, “The
Protestant Crusade: Religious Missions, Benevolence, and Reform in the United States,
1790–1840,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University, 1970); Mathews, “Organizing Process”; Clifford S. Grifªn, Their Brothers’ Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United States, 1800–
1865 (New York, 1960). Links to the South might have been weak because Southern reform
associations tended to be composed of elite rather than middle-class members and limited in
scope. See Brooke, “Cultures of Nationalism,” 8–9; McCarthy, American Creed, 78–97, 123–
44, 165–191. Yet recent work suggests that Southern reform and voluntarism may have penetrated more deeply than once thought. See Timothy James Lockley, Welfare and Charity in the
Antebellum South (Gainesville, 2007); Jonathan D. Wells, The Origins of the Southern Middle
Class 1800–1861 (Chapel Hill, 2004), 89–110; John W. Quist, Restless Visionaries: The Social
Roots of Antebellum Reform in Alabama and Michigan (Baton Rouge, 1998); John W.
Kuykendall, Southern Enterprize: The Work of National Evangelical Societies in the Antebellum
South (Westport, Conn., 1982); Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and
Culture in a Southern Town, 1784–1860 (New York, 1985), 195–236; Anne C. Loveland, Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order 1800–1860 (Baton Rouge, 1980), 159–185. On the importance of religious print, see Nord, Faith in Reading; Wosh, Spreading the Word; Trish Loughran,
“Abolitionist Nation: The Space of Organized Abolition, 1790–1840,” in idem, The Republic
in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770–1870 (New York, 2007), 303–361.
The efforts of evangelicals spurred the mobilization of counter-movements that also linked
citizens together. See Kyle Volk, “The Perils of ‘Pure Democracy’: Minority Rights, Liquor
Politics, and Popular Sovereignty in Antebellum America,” Journal of the Early Republic, XXIX
(2009), 641–679; Eric R. Schlereth, “Fits of Political Religion: Stalking Inªdelity and the Politics of Moral Reform in Antebellum America,” Early American Studies, V (2007), 288–322.
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By creating social networks based on party, denomination,
and reform, political and religious associations helped to build social capital and encourage generalized reciprocity, particularly in
the American West where migrants had to construct the social order anew.69 Although western migrants undoubtedly carried their
own “social and cultural baggage,” their visions of what constituted an ideal social order, the challenges of creating a social order
in the West should not be underestimated.70 Both settlers and
ministers sent from the East had to act fast to build the institutions
that would turn isolated individuals into a society; in fact, westward migration spurred the development of national networks.71
This bridging social capital connected the West and the East into a
larger community.
Ironically, the networks that brought Americans together also
taught them about their differences. The most pressing issue facing
Americans who moved westward was whether to permit slavery
to move with them. Their disagreements resonated nationally. As
John wrote, “it was not isolation, but familiarity, that posed the
69 The frontier was by no means vacant. The state relied on diplomacy and military force to
clear the land of Native Americans and to exert federal and state sovereignty over them. See,
among recent studies, Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America
and Australasia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, Mass., 2010); Leonard J. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America (Charlottesville, 2009); Jeffrey
Pasley, “Midget on Horseback: American Indians and the History of the American State,”
Common-place, IX (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/cp/
vol-09/no-01/pasley/.
70 Jack P. Greene, “Social and Cultural Capital in Colonial British America: A Case
Study,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXIX (1999), argues that the deªnition of social capital ought to include the social and cultural ideas that migrants use as resources as they go
about constructing new settlements (495). See also Virgina E. McCormick and Robert W.
McCormick, New Englanders on the Ohio Frontier: The Migration and Settlement of Worthington,
Ohio (Kent, 1998). On the West see Patrick Grifªn, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and
Revolutionary Frontier (New York, 2007); Roth, American Homicide, 180–249.
71 Neem, “Creating Social Capital in the Early American Republic: The View from Connecticut,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXXIX (2009), 471–495; Gerald Gamm and
Putnam, “The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 1840–1940,” ibid., XXIX
(1999), 511–557; Roth, The Democratic Dilemma: Religion, Reform, and the Social Order in the
Connecticut River Valley of Vermont, 1791–1850 (New York, 1987); Ryan, Cradle of the Middle
Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790–1865 (New York, 1981); Doyle, The Social Order of a Frontier Community: Jacksonville, Illinois, 1825–1870 (Urbana, 1978); Phillip S.
Paludan, “The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order,” American Historical Review, LXXVII (1972), 1021–1023; Tetsuo S. Miyakawa, Protestants and Pioneers: Individualism and Conformity on the American Frontier (Chicago, 1964). For a discussion of the West
as transformed in eastern ministers’ minds from chaos to social order, see Rush Welter, “The
Frontier West as Image of American Society: Conservative Attitudes before the Civil War,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (1960), 593–614.
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gravest threat to the Union.”72 For example, the emergence of
Northern abolitionism forced political leaders in Congress to consider the slavery question.73 Heretofore, Congress had tabled petitions regarding slavery’s abolition or spread, but the “gag rule”
proposed by Sen. James Hammond from South Carolina in December 1835, which stated that Congress lacked jurisdiction to receive petitions concerning slavery, forced every representative to
take a position and risk the wrath of his pro- or anti-slavery local
constituents. The national parties also had to take sides in the debate, and given their role as national mediating institutions, the
ensuing fragmentation threatened the entire nation. According to
Freehling, “Hammond’s motion endangered every congressman’s
local seat and national party—and thereby endangered national
Union itself.” In 1835, however, the countervailing pressures of
national parties prevailed. Northern Democrats joined with their
Southern counterparts to support a more moderate gag rule, sustaining partisan, and therefore national, unity.74
The emergence of abolitionism points to another problem.
Anti-slavery and its more radical abolitionist edge were not national but regional movements, emerging in the North and in
the Old Northwest. Hence, to use Putnam’s terminology, they
formed bonding capital that jeopardized national mediating institutions. America’s largest Protestant denominations fractured sectionally because of issues related to slavery. Presbyterians divided
in 1837, and again in 1857; Methodists divided in 1844; and Bap72 John, Spreading the News, 63, 257–280. See also Ayers, What Caused the Civil War?, 131–
144; Wells, Origins of the Southern Middle Class, 41–65; Brooke, “Cultures of Nationalism”;
idem, “‘To be Read by the Whole People’: Press, Party, and Public Sphere in the United
States, 1789–1840,” Proceeding of the American Antiquarian Society, CX (2000), 44–118; Katherine Anna Pierce, “Networks of Disunion: Politics, Print Culture, and the Coming of the
Civil War,” unpub. Ph. D. diss. (University of Virginia, 2006); William H. Freehling, The
Road to Disunion. I. Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854 (New York, 1990), 308–352; McCarthy,
American Creed, 123–143; Loughran, “Abolitionist Nation.” For the relationship between regionalism and nationalism, see also Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 246–293; Peter S. Onuf, “Federalism, Republicanism, and the Origins of American Sectionalism,” in
Ayers et al. (eds.), All Over the Map: Rethinking American Regions (Baltimore, 1996), 11–37.
73 Brooke, “‘To be Read by the Whole People’”; Susan Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship:
Petitioning, Antislavery, and Women’s Political Identity (Chapel Hill, 2003); Richard Carwardine,
Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New Haven, 1993); James Brewer Stewart, Holy
Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery (New York, 1976).
74 Freehling, Road to Disunion, I, 312; Brooke, “‘To be Read by the Whole People’”;
Leonard L. Richards, Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780–1860 (Baton
Rouge, 2000), 107–133; Silbey, “‘There Are Other Questions Beside That of Slavery
Merely’: The Democratic Party and Antislavery Politics,” in idem, The Partisan Imperative: The
Dynamics of American Politics Before the Civil War (New York, 1985), 87–115.
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tists differed over whether slaveholders could serve as Baptist missionaries in 1845.75
As denominations split, national interdenominational associations also felt new pressures. First, sectional denominational divisions made interdenominational efforts more suspect. Second, sectional tensions stressed national reform efforts. Northern antislavery activists pressured national reform associations to take a
stand against slavery. Some Southerners sought to keep slavery out
of national reform associations’ work, while others turned against
national associations altogether to avoid reforms that might
threaten slavery.76 Efforts to remain neutral alienated citizens from
both regions. Organizational leaders sought to convince both proslavery and anti-slavery activists that national ties were vital to
both the societies’ religious ends and the health of the Union. As
one speaker told members of the American Sunday School Union
in 1857, despite the tensions between South Carolina and Massachusetts “in politics,” in the Sunday School Union they “exchange the kiss of peace” and act as “fellow-labourers.”77
American leaders recognized that the breakdown of religious
mediating institutions threatened the entire Union. In April 1845,
Sen. Henry Clay commented: “Indeed, scarcely any public occurrence has happened for a long time that gave me so much real
concern and pain as the menaced separation of the Church, by a
line throwing all the Free States on one side, and all the Slave
States on the other. I will not say that such a separation would
necessarily produce a dissolution of the political union of these
States; but the example would be fraught with imminent danger,
and, in co-operation with other causes unfortunately existing, its
tendency on the stability of the Confederacy would be perilous
and alarming.”78 With their organizations divided, Southerners
were free to construct a pro-slavery Christianity, especially in re75 Mitchell Snay, Gospel of Disunion: Religion and Separatism in the Antebellum South (New
York, 1993); C. C. Goen, Broken Churches, Broken Nation: Denominational Schisms and the Coming
of the American Civil War (Macon, 1985); Kuykendall, Southern Enterprize, 103–107; H. Shelton
Smith, In His Image, But . . . Racism in Southern Religion, 1780–1910 (Durham, 1972).
76 Kuykendall, Southern Enterprize, 98–170; Pierce, “Networks of Disunion,” 59–77;
Wosh, Spreading the Word, 118–150; Clifford S. Grifªn, “The Abolitionists and the Benevolent Societies, 1831–1861,” Journal of Negro History, LXIV (1959), 195–216; idem, Their
Brothers’ Keepers, 177–197.
77 Thirty-third Annual Report, American Sunday School Union, 1857, quoted in Kuykendall,
Southern Enterprize, 146–147. For the Sunday School movement, see Boylan, Sunday School:
The Formation of an American Institution, 1790–1880 (New Haven, 1988).
78 Clay quoted in Goen, Broken Churches, 100–101.
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sponse to Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion. Northerners, in turn, were
free to express their hostility to slavery. The informational networks that had once brought Americans together now chronicled
each other’s sectional heresies. Tied institutionally only to their
sectional counterparts, citizens lacked the social trust that might
have moderated their hostility to each other.79
Parties also lost their ability to sustain national social trust. As
Northern anti-slavery adherents grew in numbers, associations,
and media presence, Northern voters became more determined to
elect anti-slavery representatives. Southerners were no less determined to endorse political leaders who supported slavery’s expansion. As Holt argued, the ability of the national parties to sustain
national coalitions depended largely on their ability to represent
issues other than slavery and to hold different views about slavery
in the North and South.80 But as slavery became a litmus test, the
national media made it difªcult for parties to talk out of both sides
of their mouth. The Whig party was the ªrst to collapse in the face
of these sectional pressures. In the wake of its demise emerged the
exclusively northern Republican party, which nearly captured the
presidency in 1856. Like the abolitionists, the Republicans formed
bonding social capital, linking Northerners together but lacking
bridges to the South. The only other major mediating institution
was the Democratic party, which sustained a national coalition until 1860. In 1844, Northerner, and former president, Martin Van
Buren was denied the Democratic party’s nomination because of
his unwillingness to bow to Southern demands for the immediate
annexation of Texas; in 1848, he defected, with others, to support
the northern-based Free Soil party.81 Nonetheless, the Democratic
party held together until 1860, when disagreements about slavery
led the party to run different candidates in the North and the
South and to lose the presidency to Republican Abraham Lincoln.
The fragmentation of civil society along sectional lines under79 Brooke, “Cultures of Nationalism,” 20–33; Pierce, “Networks of Disunion,” 131–174;
McCarthy, American Creed, 126–141; Charles F. Irons, The Origins of Proslavery Christianity:
White and Black Evangelicals in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia (Chapel Hill, 2008), 132–210;
Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics, 257–296; Smith, In His Image, 166–207.
80 Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, 1978); Freehling, Road to
Disunion; William E. Gienapp, “The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political System
and the Coming of the Civil War,” in Gabor S. Boritt (ed.), Why the Civil War Came (New
York, 1996), 81–124.
81 Among many sources on this subject, see Richards, Slave Power, 134–161.
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mined the social trust that national organizations had produced.
Before Lincoln’s election, Southerners and Northerners had been
willing to make compromises over slavery. For example, Northern and Southern state courts exercised comity in relation to each
other’s laws. Northern courts would return runaways and, despite
their own prohibition of slavery, permit masters in transit to carry
their slaves through free states. Southern courts would recognize
the freedom of enslaved people who had traveled North or been
freed by Northern courts. By 1860, both sides had rejected comity
altogether. In 1857, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney gave comity a
coup de grace in his Dred Scott opinion that, many Northerners worried, would open the door to nationalizing slavery by protecting
masters’ property rights throughout the Union.82
The breakdown in social trust is also evident in the turmoil
surrounding the Compromise of 1850, which consisted of ªve distinct bills: a new fugitive slave law; the admission of California as a
free state; the organization of territories taken from Mexico, without any determination about slavery (so-called popular sovereignty); a deal to limit the size of Texas in return for national help
to pay its debt; and the abolition of the slave trade in Washington,
D.C. When the ªve pieces were offered as an omnibus bill, sectional tensions trumped partisan loyalties, resulting in no overall
majority. Only when the package was broken down into discrete
bills in the Senate and House were distinct majorities possible. The
Compromise barely passed, as parties failed to maintain national
unity against the sectional beliefs of legislators and their constituents.83
After 1850, both sides concluded that they had given too
much and received too little. Southerners grew tired of sacriªcing
their interest in free trade to aid Northern manufacturers and
farmers without gaining sufªcient support for slavery.84 Northerners resented being led into war with Mexico, settling for low tariffs, and helping to sustain slavery in the South and Southwest only
to face a hostile “Slave Power” committed to expanding slavery
82 My understanding of comity is indebted to Charles W. McCurdy at the University of
Virginia. For further discussion, see Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism,
and Comity (Chapel Hill, 1981).
83 Freehling, Road to Disunion, I, 507–509.
84 Brian Schoen, The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of
the Civil War (Baltimore, 2009); Onuf and Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War, 256–265.
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throughout the Union.85 The possibility for compromise was
quickly giving way to social distrust and the potential for violence.
social trust and civil war Social capital is vital to winning
modernity’s wager. When social capital is extensive, social trust is
high, and citizens are willing to make concessions to minorities
and others within the polity. As Hetherington wrote about recent
American affairs, when trust in government is low, “public opposition to government is focused entirely on programs that require
political majorities to make sacriªces for political minorities.” Low
trust increases the transaction costs of every negotiation as the
price of giving something up rises and the expectation of receiving
a fair return declines, requiring for each transaction ever-more
difªcult negotiations.86 Hetherington’s key insight, that when citizens trust their government they are more likely to promote public policies that help others than themselves, helps to clarify the relationship between trust and the crisis that produced the American
Civil War. As reciprocity declined, the struggle regarding every
tariff, every new state’s admission, and every bill concerning slavery became more intense. Northerners and Southerners demanded
policies that served their section best; without effective, and affective, mediation, both sides lost faith in the other side’s willingness
to return favors. By the Dred Scott decision and Lincoln’s election,
the North and the South had become two separate imagined communities or, as Tocqueville had written, “rival nations.”87
Although historians have long debated the extent of the
85 Richards, Slave Power; Susan-Mary Grant, North over South: Northern Nationalism and
American Identity in the Antebellum Era (Lawrence, 2000), 61–80, 130–152; Pierce, “Networks
of Disunion,” 221–271.
86 Hetherington, Why Trust Matters, 3.
87 The development of a Southern national identity prior to secession brought many white
Southerners together into the Confederacy. See Brooke, “Cultures of Nationalism”; Gary W.
Gallagher, “Disaffection, Persistence, and Nation: Some Directions in Recent Scholarship on
the Confederacy,” Civil War History, LV (2009), 329–253; James M. McPherson, “Antebellum
Southern Exceptionalism: A New Look at an Old Question,” Civil War History, L (2004),
418–433; Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia (Chapel Hill, 2007); Anne Sarah Rubin, A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861–1868 (Chapel Hill, 2005); Benjamin L. Carp, “Nations of American Rebels:
Understanding Nationalism in Revolutionary North America and the Civil War South,”
Civil War History, XLVIII (2002), 5–33; Gallagher, The Confederate War (Cambridge, Mass.,
1997); Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the
Civil War South (Baton Rouge, 1988). For the North, see Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now:
Politics in the Civil War North (New York, 2006); Melinda Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New
American Nationalism in the Civil War North (Lawrence, 2002); Grant, North over South; Mark
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differences between the North and the South, the absence of mediating institutions to produce national bridging social capital
encouraged each region to view itself as distinctive.88 Thus, having lost trust in the North, the South’s “apostles of disunion”
convinced white Southern public opinion to abandon the Union
and embrace a new nation.89 Northerners, who—much like
Tocqueville—saw modernity’s wager and the very future of democracy to be at stake, believed, in Paludan’s words, that secession
would “produce disorder, anarchy, and a general disrespect [of minorities] for government.” “What community was safe if such a
pattern were established and endorsed?”90 As President Lincoln
stated in his 1861 inaugural address, “the central idea of secession is
the essence of anarchy.”91 To those who shared Lincoln’s conclusion, secession revealed that democracies were incapable of sustaining social order and, therefore, that free societies were doomed
to anarchy, as European defenders of monarchy proclaimed.92
Southerners were not unaware of modernity’s wager. They
tended to view their paternalistic, aristocratic traditions as bulwarks against the class conºicts that they saw to their north. Yet
even as they publicly disavowed, they privately realized that their
own system was inherently violent and unstable, which is why
they sought to limit the circulation of abolitionist literature. As
Tocqueville knew, nothing brings down aristocracy as effectively
as the idea of equality.93
Wahlgren Summers, “‘Freedom and Law Must Die Ere They Sever’: The North and the
Coming of the Civil War,” in Boritt (ed.), Why the Civil War Came, 179–200.
88 For an overview of the debate, see Thomas and Ayers, “Differences Slavery Made.”
89 Charles B. Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the
Civil War (Charlottesville, 2001). For how a minority secessionist movement relied on sectional identity and anger to pull the South out of the Union, see Freehling, Road to Disunion,
II, 269–534. Silbey, “The Surge of Republican Power: Partisan Antipathy, American Social
Conºict, and the Coming of the Civil War” (1982), in idem, The Partisan Imperative, 166–189,
reveals the extent to which Southern rhetoric built on the pre-existing ideological framework
of the Democratic party.
90 Paludin, “American Civil War,” 1017, 1019. Because the Civil War forced many Americans to consider the tension between equality and liberty and the beneªts and dangers of an
expanding state, Democracy in America received a serious reading for the ªrst time. See Zunz,
“Tocqueville and the Americans: Democracy in America as Read in Nineteenth-Century America,” in Welch (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Tocqueville, 359–396.
91 Lincoln, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1861, in Andrew Delbanco (ed.), The Portable Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1992), 200.
92 McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861–1865 (New York, 1995), 27–46.
93 For a discussion of the tension between liberal equality and racial aristocracy, see James
Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South (New York, 1990).

618 |

J OH A N N N . N EEM

Tocqueville died on April 16, 1859, just before the American Civil
War began, conªdent that equality was the way of the future and
that slavery was incompatible with modernity. In 1858, he expressed his “hope that the abolitionist cause [would] triumph in
Kansas[, desiring it] with all [his] heart, in the interest of the whole
of mankind.”94 He must have known, however, that supporting
the abolitionist cause in 1858 meant risking civil war in order to
rid America of one of humanity’s “greatest crimes.”95 His experience of, and reºections on, France made him especially sensitive
to modernity’s wager. He knew that modern societies—those divested of the transcendent and supposedly natural links that had
once held people together—could lapse into violence, anarchy,
and ultimately a return to despotism. His letters reveal his fears that
the antebellum United States could follow France’s path, and his
interpretation of mediating institutions in Democracy in America
helps to explain how the war came.
Maintaining order and liberty in a modern democratic society
is an ongoing challenge precisely because it depends on the consent of the governed. Order should not be imposed; it has to be
produced. Essential to this effort is the social trust that enables citizens to sacriªce for each other. Americans today, far removed
from the Civil War, tend to romanticize the men in blue and gray,
forgetting the Civil War’s lesson on modernity’s wager. Tocqueville watched the emergence of sectional division with horror. His
hope that Americans would ªnd a way to avoid war waned in the
1850s. Had he lived to witness the Civil War, he might have recognized a parallel to aspects of the French Revolution that he had
depicted in The Old Regime. Just as the failure of aristocratic mediating institutions had initiated the path to revolution in France,
the failure of America’s democratic mediating institutions had created the conditions for civil war. Although Tocqueville may have
concluded that war was justiªed to eradicate an evil as great as
slavery, he also would have offered eloquent testimony about the
importance of fellow citizens treating each other with the generosity and respect necessary to sustain the social trust on which
democratic liberty and peace depends.
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